Administrative Overreach: Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Constitutional Framework

Abstract

The relationship between the judiciary and the administrative bodies that exercise quasi-judicial powers have long been the subject of debate in India. While bodies such as regulatory commissions and tribunals play a crucial role in dispute adjudication and enforcement of statutory obligations, there still exist an overlapping of powers and irregularities in procedure, and instances of bias which have raised serious concerns regarding the independence and the sanctity of the judiciary. This paper undertakes a critical examination of whether the limitation of administrative powers is necessary to preserve the judicial autonomy within the constitutional framework of India. The paper further examines the historical evolution of the administrative law commencing with the early systems of governance, establishment of tribunals during the colonial era, and their extensive expansion in post-independence India. Various tribunals and institutions such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the National Green Tribunal, and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal have developed their own parallel internal structures which is intended to ensure speedy disposal of cases. However, these bodies have created challenges which concern accountability, adherence, and transparency which often result in judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, constitutional safeguards against administrative actions have also been examined under Article 31, 136, and 226 which highlight the judiciary’s role in maintaining oversight. The study further concludes with the proposition of enhanced judicial oversight, transparent tribunal procedures, independent appointment mechanisms, and uniformity in procedural standards to ensure that administrative efficiency can coexist with judicial independence under the modern implications of the constitutional framework.